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Federal law authorizes district courts to order discovery for use in a proceeding before a "foreign or 
international tribunal." While that law, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, permits interested persons to request such discovery, 
neither the statutory language nor Supreme Court jurisprudence definitively resolves whether private arbitral 
tribunals fall within its scope. Unsurprisingly, the lack of clear guidance on this matter has triggered a circuit 
split, with the Second and Fifth Circuits generally declining to extend § 1782 to private arbitral tribunals while 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits broadly interpret the statutory language to apply § 1782 to private arbitral 
tribunals. In the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrine is in flux.
A recent Second Circuit decision, In re Guo, has exacerbated this inter-circuit disagreement. Guo held that the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration (CIETAC) falls outside the scope of § 1782 because it is a 
private arbitral body, thereby affirming prior circuit precedent. However, the Second Circuit's reasoning has 
evolved because Guo employed a "functional analysis test," descriptively similar to (though substantively 
different from) a test employed in the Eleventh Circuit. Guo's reasoning will inform future litigation over § 1782 
requests for use in private arbitral tribunals and whether, under the functional analysis, tribunals formed 
pursuant to bilateral investment treaties warrant a different outcome.
Current discussion of § 1782 begins with the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Intel v. Advanced Micro 
Devices. Intel held that the European Commission constituted a tribunal under § 1782 when it acts as a first-
instance decisionmaker in its functioning. The court found that a district court may order production of 
documents for use in a "foreign or international tribunal" but did not explicitly include private arbitral tribunals 
within § 1782's scope.
Federal circuits split over whether private arbitration tribunals fall under Section 1782's scope. A series of pre-
Intel precedents held that they did not. In 1999, the Second Circuit decided National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (NBC), finding that in light of § 1782's legislative history, the statute only extends to 
entities that act as state instrumentalities or with the state's authority. Soon after, the Fifth Circuit also found 
that private arbitral tribunals did not fall under § 1782 in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International.
In Intel's wake, both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that § 1782 applies to private arbitral tribunals. In 
In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings (AJL) the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 
statutory text and context in which § 1782 was drafted allows for the inclusion of private commercial arbitral
tribunals. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co. reasoned that Congress did not intend 
narrowly read 'tribunal'.
Currently, the Eleventh Circuit does not have a binding appellate decision on point. In 2012, it found that § 
1782 applies to private arbitral tribunals in In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. Employing 
a "functional analysis" (though one clearly different from the Second Circuit's), the Eleventh Circuit asks 
whether the tribunal 1) acts as a first-instance adjudicative decision-maker, 2) permits the gathering and 
submission of evidence, 3) has the authority to determine liability and impose penalties, and 4) issues 
decisions subject to judicial review. The court, however, vacated its opinion in 2014, thereby declining to 
answer what constitutes a foreign tribunal and leaving "the resolution of the matter for another day." Without a 
binding appellate decision on this point, district courts within the circuit remain divided over the point.
Guo resuscitates issues left on the table after Consorcio. Interestingly, while Guo like Consorcio purported to 
apply a functional analysis, it reached a directly contrary conclusion on whether a private international tribunal 
fell within the ambit of § 1782. Guo's "functional" approach examines the entity's degree of state affiliation, 
functional independence possessed by the entity, and degree to which the parties' contract controls the panel's 
jurisdiction—in short, whether the entity's functional attributes are "most commonly associated with private 
arbitration." Applying those factors, the Second Circuit found that CIETAC "functions essentially independently" 
from China, that Chinese courts play a limited role over review of arbitrations and that CIETAC's jurisdiction 
derives entirely from the parties' contract, not the Chinese State.
Guo's reaffirmation of its pre-Intel precedent and its invocation of one functional approach raise three 
questions.
First, any functional analysis creates the odd spectacle of putting the private arbitral institution under a judicial 
microscope. While their factors differ, both the Guo and the Consorcio tests partly turn on fact-based issues of 
institutional design. The irony cannot be lost when one steps back to consider that a key purpose of the 
international arbitral system was to keep disputes out of court. Moreover, the very undertaking required by the 
functional approach is fraught: Generally, arbitral institutions enjoy an absolute immunity from suit (and 
process) in federal and state court. Consequently, not only is it odd to see the institution under the judicial 
microscope, common-law immunity virtually ensures that judicial examination will be at best incomplete and at 
worst inaccurate.
Second, Guo leaves open the possibility of a different result in cases before investment and trade tribunals. 
Under the Guo analysis, unlike private arbitration tribunals, such entities often derive their authority not from 
the parties' contract but, rather, from bilateral and multilateral treaties. At the same time, under the Consorcio 
analysis, they share some common attributes with private tribunals such as the ability to determine liability. 
Some early § 1782 jurisprudence, particularly In re Oxus Gold (from a District Court in New Jersey), sketched 
out this possibility. Guo suggests that the Second Circuit might be headed in this direction.
Finally, this circuit split encourages forum shopping in § 1782 proceedings. Identically situated parties seeking 
discovery in support of arbitration before the same private tribunal will receive different receptions in the 
Second and Fifth Circuits than in the Sixth and Fourth Circuits. Litigants before the Eleventh Circuit and 
elsewhere will be writing on a blank jurisprudential slate. One hopes that Supreme Court intervention will clean 
up this increasingly messy and important area of international arbitration law.
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